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Kilburn v. Libya: Cause for Alarm?
In Kilburn v. Libya, the D.C. Circuit held that a plaintiff may turn to United
States courts to seek recovery from a foreign nation for injuries suffered at the
hands of a terrorist organization with which the foreign nation was affiliated -
if actions taken by that foreign nation were a proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injury. Kilburn is part of an emerging pattern. Over the past ten years,
Congress and the courts have made it increasingly easy for plaintiffs to secure
compensation from foreign nations for injuries arising out of terrorist acts.' In
particular, courts have liberally interpreted the state sponsor of terrorism
amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which
permits plaintiffs to sue those nations designated as state sponsors of
terrorism3 for damages in U.S. courts.4
Yet Kilburn also broke with prior cases. Kilburn involved an unusual set of
facts and resolved the questions they presented in atypical fashion. Prior to
1. Kilburn v. Libya, 376 F.3 d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
2. See Jack Goldsmith & Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism, in
CML LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM 109 (John Norton Moore ed., 2004). For cogent
criticisms of this expansion of the susceptibility of foreign sovereigns to suit, see Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations: One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back?, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 71, 81 (1998); Keith E. Sealing, 'State
Sponsors of Terrorism' Are Entitled to Due Process Too: The Amended Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act Is Unconstitutional, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 395, 397-98 (2ooo); and Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross, Note, A Critique of the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &POL. 887, 888-89 (2002).
3. The State Department has designated the following nations as state sponsors of terrorism:
Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of
Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2005).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 16o5(a), (a)(7) (2000) ("A foreign state shall not be immune... [when] money
damages are sought [from] a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an
act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources ... for such an act ... ").
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Kilburn, most cases brought pursuant to the terrorism amendment had
involved terrorist acts committed direcdy by a foreign nation or instigated by a
foreign nation and committed by that nation's agent.' Kilburn, by contrast,
involved damage done by a nonstate actor who received material support and
resources from the defendant nation 6 but who was not its agent.7 Moreover,
prior to Kilburn, courts had seldom permitted plaintiffs to seek relief for
injuries foreign nations had not specifically intended to cause.8 Indeed, the
United States, appearing as amicus curiae in Kilburn, asserted that it was not
clear from existing case law that "the allegation of a foreign state's general
support for the terrorist group that carried out the act of terrorism is sufficient
to satisfy the statute."9 The Kilburn court, by contrast, adopted a more relaxed,
proximate cause standard for jurisdiction."0
This Comment argues that Kilburn is inconsistent with the FSIA scheme. I
do not weigh the merits of the Kilburn causation standard on its own terms."
Rather, I contend that Kilburn will lead to extensive jurisdictional discovery.
Permitting such discovery not only would create a disjunction between foreign
sovereign immunity practice on the one hand and domestic sovereign
immunity practice and international law on the other, but it also might
frustrate Congress's goals in passing the terrorism amendment. I begin by
explaining why the adoption of the Kilburn standard makes it more likely that
courts will engage in jurisdictional discovery. In Part II, I elucidate the history
of the FSIA and use that history to demonstrate why extensive jurisdictional
discovery is incompatible with the FSIA. Finally, in Part III, I offer alternatives
to the Kilburn standard.
S. See, e.g., Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112 (D.D.C. 2003)
("Iran was responsible for the selection of the target [and] provided much of the
information for how to carry out the bombing." (internal quotation marks omitted)),
vacated, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32618, at *13 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2005) (vacating the
conclusions of law but affirming the findings of fact).
6. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 18 (D.D.C. 1998).
7. Kilburn v. Libya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that "a terrorist organization
sponsored by Libya" tortured the plaintiff).
8. See Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 91, 97-98 (D.D.C. 2002).
9. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at lO n.4,
Kilburn, 376 F.3d 1123 (No. 03-7117) (citations omitted and emphasis added).
10. See Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1128.
11. Cf. Alison Elizabeth Chase, Legal Mechanisms of the International Community and the United
States Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 136-37 (2004) (arguing
that the problem of "[s]tate sponsorship of international terrorism is ... not effectively
addressed by... the policies of the United States").
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I. KILBURN AND JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
Kilburn is likely to provoke extensive jurisdictional discovery- discovery
"[t]o determine whether the defendant is immune from suit."'2 Such discovery
is likely when the exception to sovereign immunity that the plaintiff wishes to
invoke13 is legally or factually difficult for her to justify or is susceptible to a
defendant's attack.
The FSIA lifts foreign sovereign immunity with respect to several different
categories of action.'4 A prospective plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to fit
her case into one of these categories. 5 In assessing whether a plaintiff has
managed to do so, courts sometimes need only engage in straightforward legal
analysis, as when the category the plaintiff invokes requires them to discern
whether an alleged act constitutes torture.' 6 Sometimes, however, courts have
to parse complicated facts' 7 or apply ambiguous legal standardsf. The Kilburn
holding -that plaintiffs need only plead proximate cause in order to invoke the
court's jurisdiction -will require courts to engage in complicated factual
inquiries. For example, courts will have to follow convoluted money trails and
understand the relationships between various terrorist cells.19 Moreover,
proximate cause is a more ambiguous legal standard than intent or knowledge,
further complicating the judicial taskY0
12. Joseph M. Terry, Comment, Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1029, 1030 (1999); see also Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of
Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that when a defendant challenges the
factual predicate for a court's assertion of'jurisdiction, the court should order discovery).
13. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) ("[T]he
FSIA [is] the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.").
14. For instance, a plaintiff may sue a foreign nation in connection with a commercial act
performed in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 16o5(a) (2) (2000).
15. See Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3 d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2001).
16. Cf Price v. Libya, 294 F. 3d 82, 93-95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiffs' complaint
was insufficiently detailed to permit the court to determine whether the wrongs allegedly
done to them amounted to torture).
17. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 446 (D.C. Cir.
199o) (discussing whether a company or actor was the agent of a foreign nation).
18. See, e.g., Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 930 (2d Cir. 1998) (analyzing
whether there was a sufficient nexus between a foreign country's commercial activity and a
plaintiff's suit).
19. Indeed, the Kilburn plaintiffs required the assistance of the former State Department
Coordinator for Counterrrorism. See Kilburn v. Libya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
2o. See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q.49, 82 (1991). This problem is compounded by the confusion in
U.S. courts over what should count as "material support." Compare Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1130
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My fear-that Kilburn will provoke more jurisdictional discovery-is not
unfounded.2' Last year, the D.C. Circuit had to consider how much
jurisdictional discovery to permit in the aftermath of Kilburn.2
II. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY WITH
THE FSIA AND THE TERRORISM AMENDMENT
Extensive jurisdictional discovery is inconsistent with the general purposes
of the FSIA scheme and with the specific purposes of the terrorism
amendment. Congress passed the FSIA to make foreign sovereign immunity
track U.S. sovereign immunity.2" Accordingly, most courts to consider the
FSIA's tort exception have read it as congruent with the Federal Tort Claims
Act.' 4 But the United States would never submit to extensive jurisdictional
discovery on the basis of an allegation that an act or omission by a U.S. official
was the proximate cause of torture or other egregious injury. In Arar v.
Ashcroft, for example, a suit brought by a Canadian-Syrian dual citizen
allegedly rendered to Syria by the United States, the United States has opposed
(stating that there is no requirement that support "be directly traceable to a particular
terrorist act"), with United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding
certain provisions of material support definition void for vagueness), and Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d lOOO, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) ("To hold the defendants liable for
donating money without knowledge of the donee's intended criminal use of the funds
would impose strict liability.").
21. Congress may have been aware of the potential for jurisdictional discovery. It authorized the
Attorney General to "stay any request, demand, or order for discovery on the United States
... [under the state sponsor of terrorism exception if she] certifies [it] would significantly
interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national security operation." 28
U.S.C. S 16oS(g)(i) (2000).
22. See, e.g., Beecham v. Libya, 424 F. 3d 11o9 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Indeed, in Beecham, although the
D.C. Circuit returned the case to the district court because the appeal was premature, amici
urged the court to allow full-blown discovery on the question of causation rather than
merely jurisdictional discovery. See Brief of Amici Curiae Blake Kilburn et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 13, Beecham, 424 F.3d 11o9 (No. 04-7037).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 9, 13, 21, 31, 33 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6607-o8, 6611, 6620, 6630, 6632. The Report states: "The exceptions ... correspond to
many of the claims with respect to which the U.S. Government retains immunity .... Id.
at 6620.
24. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 258, 423
(2d ed. 2003); see also Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ("The
FTCA is a codification of the principle of restrictive immunity with regard to the U.S.
Government on a domestic level.").
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discovery on the causation issue.2" Requiring a foreign nation to submit to
discovery to which the U.S. would not accede violates the principle of
congruity underlying the FSIA.
Congress also hoped that the FSIA would square U.S. practice with
international law,26 but jurisdictional discovery, because it can violate
customary international law, 7 may vitiate that hope. First, it potentially
infringes the comity of nations.8 Foreign law may forbid disclosure of
documents plaintiffs need for discovery. 9 Therefore, if a U.S. court orders
production in such situations, it overrides foreign law. This contravenes
principles of comity and is disapproved by U.S. jurists"° and other nations.3'
Second, jurists and nations agree on the need to limit the jurisdictional
25. See Letter to Judge Trager on Behalf of the United States, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-249-
DGT-VVP (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 18, 2005), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/september-nth/docs/ArarStateSecrets.pdf; see also Ellsberg v. Mitchell,
709 F.2d 51, 55-56 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7, 9-11, 14, 19-20, 22, 25, 27 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6605, 6607-1o, 6613, 6619, 6621, 6624, 6626. As the Supreme Court has
explained, "the Act codifie[d] .. . the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity," Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983), which had by that time become
the prevailing norm in the international community. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting
Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952) ("[lit
should be observed that [even] in most of the countries still following the classical theory
there is a school of influential writers favoring the restricting theory . "), reprinted in
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, app. 2 at 713 (1976).
27. I define customary international law for these purposes as the opinions of jurists and the
practices of nations. See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 20 (June 3)
("It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked
for primarily in the actual practice and opiniojuris of States .... ).
zaS. Comity is not an "absolute" requirement of international law, but neither is it a matter of
"mere courtesy and good will." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). I include
comity as international law in this discussion because Congress wanted the FSIA to
"promote harmonious international relations." Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 15o F.3d 477,
480 (5th Cir. 1998). For an excellent review of why discovery may infringe the comity of
nations, see Bernard H. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of
Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv.
733 (1983).
29. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (1oth Cir.
1977).
30. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
31. See Michael L. Novicoff, Blocking and Clawing Back in the Name of Public Policy: The United
Kingdom's Protection of Private Economic Interests Against Adverse Foreign Adjudications, 7 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 12 (1985); cf European Convention on State Immunity art. 18, Europ. T.S.
No. o74 (entered into force June 11, 1976) (limiting the power of a court to enforce a
discovery order).
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discovery required of foreign sovereigns because of dignity concerns. In In re
Papandreou, the D.C. Circuit cited international practice and refused to permit
the district court to order certain kinds of discovery because they "offend[ed]
diplomatic niceties."32 Third, the enforcement of discovery requests may result
in yet other violations of customary international law. When a discovery order
is disobeyed, for example, the court usually holds the offender in contempt,33
but it is far from clear that international law permits a court to take this action
against a sovereign state.34
Congress's purposes in passing the terrorism amendment were slightly
different than its purposes in passing the FSIA. It hoped first, to provide
effective remedies for victims of terrorism, and, second, to deter nations from
sponsoring terrorism.35 But extensive jurisdictional discovery is likely to drive
foreign sovereign defendants out of court. Foreign sovereigns have only
recently begun to participate in terrorism-related litigation, 36 and requiring
them to submit to extensive, intrusive discovery may reverse this incipient
trend.37
32. 139 F.3d 247, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing how "sensitive diplomatic considerations"
of the State Department might be upset (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf Int'l Law
Comm'n, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Comments and Observations
Received from Governments, 58, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/ 4io (Feb. 17, 1988) (noting the United
Kingdom's position that it is not "appropriate for a domestic court to order the Government
of another State, without its consent, to do or not to do particular acts").
33. See, e.g., First City, Texas-Houston v. Rafidain Bank, 281 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2002);
Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468 ( 9 th Cir. 1992).
34. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, Belize
Telecom Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, No. 05-12641-CC (iith Cir. filed May 4, 2005) (arguing that
holding a foreign sovereign in contempt not only would contravene international practice
but would also adversely affect our relations with other nations).
35. 142 CONG. REc. S3463 (Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Brown) (arguing that "[b]eyond
ensuring that American citizens have recourse after brutal terrorist acts, this section
represents a vital counterterrorism measure," and noting that "I am confident that the threat
of enforceable judgments and levies against assets from U.S. courts will be a significant
inducement for countries to get themselves off the State Department's terrorist list").
36. DELLAPENNA, supra note 24, at 418 & n.578, 420 n.594.
37. Once a sovereign has appeared in court, the sovereign is more likely than not to see
litigation through to its completion. Indeed, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
emerged in part from cases in which sovereigns made special appearances to contest
jurisdiction and ended up litigating claims and counterclaims. See, e.g., The Sao Vicente v.
Transportes Maritimos do Estado, 281 F. 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1922). But "without an
opportunity to obtain an authoritative determination of its amendability [sic] to suit at the
earliest possible opportunity," Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F.2d 344, 347 (7th
Cir. 1987), a foreign sovereign is not likely to appear in court at all.
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Finally, extensive jurisdictional discovery undermines Congress's efforts to
deter terrorists. If the Sudan is not only considered liable for damages wrought
by al Qaeda long after the Sudan ejected Osama bin Laden,"s but also must
disclose sensitive material when contesting such liability, it will have little
incentive to cooperate with U.S. courts. Disclosures may be embarrassing and
the resulting shame may be an additional sanction.3 9 Moreover, it is not clear
whether, in the international sphere, disclosure of malfeasance induces
compliance with or deviance from international law.4"
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE DISCOVERY DEBACLE
I propose two solutions to the problem I have identified -that Kilburn will
require courts to engage in extensive jurisdictional discovery. First, U.S. courts
should require plaintiffs to plead that a foreign sovereign knew of or intended
to support specific terrorist acts-not that her injuries were merely the
proximate result of support provided to a terrorist organization -before
ordering jurisdictional discovery. The D.C. Circuit considered this argument
but failed to realize that the only way courts can affect the amount of discovery
required is by changing the pleading requirements. 4 The D.C. Circuit also
failed to consider the specific international law ramifications of its decision.42
Requiring plaintiffs to plead knowledge or intent would be consistent with the
FSIA's goals43 and, although it would not make causation a legal question, it
would reduce the number of fact questions that would come before the court
38. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2005).
39. See ELIZA AHMED ET AL., SHAME MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION (2001).
40. Cf Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 1O2 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 81 (2003) ("[A]n individual's perception of the extent of evasion powerfully
predicts compliance behavior: the higher an individual believes the rate of... cheating to
be, the more likely he or she is to cheat too."). If nations become aware of the extent to
which other nations derogate from international requirements, they may be induced to
follow suit.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18 (arguing that by permitting the resolution of legal
questions rather than requiring the investigation of factual puzzles Congress makes
determinations of jurisdiction easier).
42. The D.C. Circuit relied on Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., in which
the Supreme Court read "caused by" to mean proximate cause but expressly asserted that
"[n]ormal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means
of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements." 513 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1995). The
Supreme Court's description does not apply to FSIA litigation.
43. Steven R. Swanson, Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 445, 482 (1999) ("Allowing a vague, unformed argument would
undercut FSIA goals.").
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and would permit courts to apply a rule rather than a standard.' Thus, a
plaintiff who could not persuasively explain how she intended to prove
knowledge or intent at trial would not be entitled to discovery.
This change would cause little harm to plaintiffs' interests.45 Plaintiffs
bringing suit under the terrorism amendment must often demonstrate
knowledge or intent in the liability phase. After Cicippio-Puleo v. Iran, a recent
case in which the D.C. Circuit found that the Flatow Amendment46 did not
create a cause of action against foreign sovereigns, 47 courts have required
plaintiffs to "identify a particular cause of action arising out of a specific source
of law ' '4 8 before finding foreign sovereign defendants liable for terrorist acts.
State law- the usual source for such causes of action - often requires proof of
tight causal links. Even the Kilburn plaintiffs acknowledged that "[l]iability
might require more [facts], depending on the claim being pursued."49
Nor does this proposal undermine Congress's efforts to provide a remedy
for victims of terrorism. Plaintiffs are often in the best position to unearth the
facts that might justify an assertion of jurisdiction, and they should be required
to explore avenues open to them without court assistance before discovery is
granted. For instance, in Beecham v. Libya, the question was whether a U.S.
military officer "received national defense information... that the instructions
for the La Belle attack had been sent from the Libyan government.""0 The
plaintiffs could readily have sought that information from the United States
before demanding it from Libya.
44. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
45. I advocate heightening only pleading requirements, not proof requirements. Cf. Assoc. of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (distinguishing the facts a
plaintiff must allege to demonstrate standing and the facts a plaintiff must prove to secure
relief).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 16o5 note (2000). The Amendment provides that those injured by terrorist acts
shall have a federal cause of action against "official[s], employee[s], or agent[s]" of state
sponsors of terrorism.
47. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d io24 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
48. Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 218, 223 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32618, at *53 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2005) (imposing liability for, among other
offenses, battery, which "[under] North Carolina [law] . . . [requires] intent" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 37o F. 3d 41, 58-6o (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding that plaintiffs who could not point to any state law cause of action could not
maintain their suit against a foreign sovereign), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1928 (2005).
49. Brief of Appellee at 22, Kilburn v. Libya, 376 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-7117); see,
e.g., In re Terrorist Acts on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 8ol (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(requiring plaintiffs to plead "facts [that would] suggest the [sovereign defendants] knew
they were making contributions to terrorist fronts" (emphasis added)).
so. Brief for Appellants at 7, Beecham v. Libya, 424 F. 3d 11o9 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-7307).
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Second, I propose that when a sovereign defendant objects to discovery, the
court should permit it to submit discoverable material in camera and ex parte.'
If foreign nations were assured that the information they submitted would not
be disclosed to the public, foreign sovereigns might be more inclined to
participate in litigation and might be more likey to abjure sponsorship of future
terrorist acts.
Again, this proposal is not unrealistic. Congress seems to have
contemplated in passing the FSIA that courts would permit foreign sovereigns
and their agents to invoke privileges analogous to those the United States and
its officers may invoke. 2 This scheme would also be consistent with notions of
international comity. As the Supreme Court has explained, discovery
"asymmetries" are frowned upon."
CONCLUSION
In this Comment, I have sought to demonstrate why Kilburn is inconsistent
with the FSIA scheme. Although the Kilburn causation standard is not
inherently problematic, the case is likely to have far-reaching effects on the
scope and frequency of jurisdictional discovery ordered under the Act. I urge
courts not to adopt the Kilburn standard. Rather, courts should impose more
stringent pleading requirements up front and take greater care to protect the
interests of foreign sovereigns. The United States is better served when foreign
nations show up in court than when they are deterred from climbing the
courthouse steps by the threat of burdensome discovery requests.
STEPHEN TOWNLEY
51. For an example of how this might work, see United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1670 (2005).
52. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), at 23 & n.2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6621-22 & n.2
(referring to exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act). For instance, in Taiwan v.
United States District Court, the Ninth Circuit permitted a foreign diplomat embroiled in an
FSIA case to claim testimonial immunity. 128 F.3d 712 (9 th Cir. 1997).
53. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 540 n.25 (1987).
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